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The
seminar is held in hybrid
format, in person (Múzeum
krt. 4/i Room 224) and
online.
________________________________________________________
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| 3
May (Friday) 4:15 PM
Room 224 + ONLINE |
Elia
Zardini
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Department of Logic and
Theoretical Philosophy
Complutense University of
Madrid
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Against
the World
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In
previous works, I’ve developed a
theory of transparent truth (LW)
and a theory of tolerant baldness
(NLS) which
validate the law of excluded
middle (LEM) and the law of
non-contradiction (LNC), and which
solve the semantic paradoxes and
the paradoxes of vagueness by
restricting instead the structural
properties of contraction and
transitivity respectively.
Moreover, the principle of
distributivity of conjunction over
disjunction (D) fails in the
systems—in fact, even the weaker
principles of modularity (M) and
orthomod- ularity (O) fail.
However, since neither kind of
paradox seems to involve D, M or O
in the first place, it might seem
that the solutions I’ve proposed
feature logics that are unnec-
essarily weak. I’ll first argue
that these appearances are
deceiving: if a non-contractive or
non-transitive theory of anything
making certain natural assumptions
(which crucially include LEM and
LNC and which are shared by both LW
and NLS) is to
work at all, D, M and O just have
to fail. I’ll then offer a
philosophical explanation of the
failures of these principles in LW
and NLS, which
will require to bring out a
common, hitherto unnoticed
metaphysical consequence of these
systems, and which will thus have
the upshot of bringing for the
first time together two systems
that might up to now have seemed
very remote from one another. More
in detail, I’ll show that both LW
and NLS assert
the non-existence of the world,
and that such assertion in turn
implies the relevant instances of
LEM; I’ll then argue that these
circumstances explain the failure
of D, M and O, since these
principles allow one to go from
the disjunctions of incomplete
ways things are licenced by LEM to
a disjunction of complete ways
things are, with the latter
contradicting the non-existence of
the world.
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