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The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!

The 60 minute lecture is followed by a 10 minute break and a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.

The scope of the Forum includes all aspects of theoretical philosophy, including:

  • logic and philosophy of formal sciences
  • philosophy of science
  • modern metaphysics
  • epistemology
  • philosophy of language
  • problems in history of philosophy and history of science, relevant to the above topics
  • particular issues in natural and social sciences, important for the discourses in the main scope of the Forum.


17 September (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
János Kelemen
Department of General Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös University, Budapest
Lukács György nyelv- és tudományfilozófiá(i)
(Georg Lukács's philosophy(ies) of language and science)
Az előadás a szerző „The Rationalism of Georg Lukács” (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014) c. könyvét mutatja be. Elemzi „Az ész trónfosztása” racionalitás- és racionalizmus-koncepcióját, összevetve azt a popperi felfogással és a mai koncepciókkal. Kitér az „irracionalizmus paradoxonára” (Lukács) és az „irracionalitás paradoxonára” (Davidson). Ebben a keretben tárgyalja Lukács tudomány-elméletét és „nyelvfilozófiáját” a filozófus korai korszakától az Ontológiáig.

24 September (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Samuel C. Fletcher
 Logic and Philosophy of Science,  University of California, Irvine
On the Reduction of General Relativity to Newtonian Gravitation
Intertheoretic reduction in physics aspires to be both perfectly general and to be explanatory: it aims to relate or otherwise account for as many features of the two theories as possible, and it endeavors to explain why the older, simpler theory to which the other reduces continues to be as successful as it is. Despite often being introduced as straightforward cases of intertheoretic reduction, candidate accounts of the reduction of general relativity (GR) to Newtonian gravitation (NG) have either been insufficiently general, or have not clearly been able to explain the empirical success of NG, such as it is. Building on work by Ehlers and others, I propose a different account of the reduction relation that is perfectly general and meets the explanatory demand one would make of it. In doing so, I highlight the role that a topology on the collection of all spacetimes plays in denying the relation, and how the choice of topology corresponds with broader or narrower classes of observables that one demands be well-approximated in the limit.