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The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!

The 60 minute lecture is followed by a 10 minute break and a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.

The scope of the Forum includes all aspects of theoretical philosophy, including:

  • logic and philosophy of formal sciences
  • philosophy of science
  • modern metaphysics
  • epistemology
  • philosophy of language
  • problems in history of philosophy and history of science, relevant to the above topics
  • particular issues in natural and social sciences, important for the discourses in the main scope of the Forum.


8 April (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Krisztina Orbán*
Hong Yu Wong**
*Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London
**Philosophy of Neuroscience, Centre for Integrative Neuroscience,
University of Tuebingen
The Zero Standpoint View on Awareness of Oneself ‘From the Inside’
There is a natural distinction between external and internal perception. Vision, audition and touch are modes of perception of objects in the world, including the subject. One can look at one’s own hand, hear one’s own voice or rub one’s own eyes. Such perception is not perception from the inside. This we call external perception. In contrast, internal perception (e.g. proprioception, kinaesthesia, and nociception) is perception from the inside. Internal perception is perception of parts or features of the subject of perception, but only for the subject – assuming a natural design. We will point out an asymmetry between external (e.g. vision) and internal (e.g. proprioception) perception in terms of the notion of frame of reference. We will argue that perception of objects (including the subject) through external perception is standpoint relative, while internal perception of parts and features of the subject is not. The first kind of frame of reference is a Standpoint-relative one and the second is the Zero-standpoint frame of reference.

The Zero-standpoint view has an interesting implication. An object presented through external perception is open to the Frege Puzzle. External perception allows that an object can be experienced from different spatial standpoints. This opens the possibility of error where one and the same object can be thought to be different because it is experienced from two different spatial standpoints. In contrast, the subject cannot seem to be a different object from a different standpoint ‘from the inside’, because there is no distinct standpoint to be had. The thought is that the subject presented through internal perception is not presented from a spatial standpoint which opens the possibility that the object so perceived could seem to be distinct from the object that the subject is. Rather, the subject is always already presented in a first-person fashion through internal perception. This has powerful consequences for first person thought and for understanding immunity to error through misidentification relative to ‘I’.

15 April (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Márton Gömöri
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös University Budapest
Only conjunction
Probability theory will be reformulated in terms of an event structure endowed only with conjunction operation---no disjunction and negation. Philosophical motivations and elementary technical results will be discussed.

22 April (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Gergő Orbán
Department of Theoretical Physics
Wigner Research Centre for Physics, Budapest
Perception is a process that is inherently uncertain: limited or partial sensory data renders interpretations ambiguous, while variability in either in the environment or the sensory apparatus appears as noise in the inference process. Efficient computations under uncertainty entail probabilistic approaches. A crucial component of probabilistic inference is the integration of prior knowledge with sensory evidence: in order to draw inferences about the features of the environment biological agents need to rely on their expectations about (co-)occurrences of environmental features. While under simple  circumstances these expectations are invariable across individuals, more complex stimuli/tasks suggest individual differences. We will explore how these individual differences can be revealed and will investigate if these can account for the variable choices of individuals.

29 April (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
György Szondy
How generalized four-force leads to scalar-tensor gravity
In Special Relativity Minkowski four-force is known to be perpendicular to the four-velocity and four-momentum vector. In the ‘50s Károly Novobátzky worked out the generalization of this four-force. We will shortly explain how this formalism can be used to describe conservative fields and how it leads to a Scalar-Tensor gravity that also fits the mathematical background of GPS.

We will also explain how this approach leads (by applying two well-known transformations) to express the scalar field from the scalar curvature of the metric tensor – the goal that has been missed by Brans and Dicke.