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The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!

The 60 minute lecture is followed by a 10 minute break and a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.

The scope of the Forum includes all aspects of theoretical philosophy, including:

  • logic and philosophy of formal sciences
  • philosophy of science
  • modern metaphysics
  • epistemology
  • philosophy of language
  • problems in history of philosophy and history of science, relevant to the above topics
  • particular issues in natural and social sciences, important for the discourses in the main scope of the Forum.


8 May (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Réka Markovich
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös University
, Budapest
Modalities, operators, actions
In Handbook of Philosophical Logic Åqvist referred to deontic logic as the domain of which there is no issue that could be considered as a cleared one. Sure enough, several questions are waiting for clarification. I am primarily interested in describing law with formal semantic tools. I am convinced our success depends on what modalities we consider, what operators we use, and what description of actions we work with.

15 May (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
László E. Szabó
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös University
, Budapest
"The laws of physics have the same form in all inertial frames of reference."
This is the special principle of relativity in its most widespread formulation. While there is a longstanding discussion about the interpretation of the extended, general principle of relativity, there seems to be a consensus that the above quoted special principle of relativity is absolutely unproblematic.
In my talk, I will challenge this view through an analysis of the precise meaning of the statement. The analysis will be based on a precise and general mathematical formulation of the principle. It will be seen, however, that the main difficulties are not formal or mathematical in nature, but rather conceptual. What is counted as a “law of physics” here -- for example, the Maxwell equations, or a Coulomb solution, describing a concrete physical situation? How to identify a physical law, and how to identify its counterpart in another reference frame? What does it take to be of the “same form”? -- one and the same physical law can be expressed in different, but logically equivalent forms. In what sense can a law of physics be “in” an inertial frame of reference? How do we identify a physical quantity, and how do we identify its counterpart in another reference frame? If they are identified by means of their operational definitions, how are the etalons and the measuring devices shared between the different reference frames? Under what physical conditions can two measuring devices -- one being at rest in one inertial frame, the other being at rest in another inertial frame -- be regarded as the same measuring device in the same (pointer-position) state? -- and, the similar question about the physical objects to be measured. After all, under what conditions can a physical object or phenomenon -- Galileo's fishes, butterflies, and smokes -- be regarded as being “in” or “co-moving with” an inertial frame of reference? In fact, some of these questions do not have a satisfactory answer.

22 May (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Gábor Hofer-Szabó
Institute of Philosophy
Research Center for the Humanities
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Local causality
In the talk we are trying to spell out Bell's original characterization of local causality in an algebraic field theoretical setting.