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The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!

The 60 minute lecture is followed by a 10 minute break and a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.

The scope of the Forum includes all aspects of theoretical philosophy, including:

  • logic and philosophy of formal sciences
  • philosophy of science
  • modern metaphysics
  • epistemology
  • philosophy of language
  • problems in history of philosophy and history of science, relevant to the above topics
  • particular issues in natural and social sciences, important for the discourses in the main scope of the Forum.


2 May  (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Márton Gömöri
Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös University, Budapest
Ontological incompleteness of classical electrodynamics
What does it take to be an entity existing in space and time? As an answer to this question, a formal condition is suggested in terms of classical physics. It is shown, however, that the electromagnetic field, or even a local part of it, does not meet this condition in classical electrodynamics.

Related paper:

9 May  (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Gábor Hofer-Szabó
Institute for Communication and Cultural Studies, King Sigismund College, Budapest
Bell inequality in algebraic quantum field theory
In the talk it will be argued that the violation of the Bell inequality in algebraic quantum field theory does not exclude a common causal explanation of a set of quantum correlations if we abandon commutativity between the common cause and the correlating events. Moreover, it will turn out that the common cause is local, i.e. localizable in the common past of the correlating events. It will be argued furthermore that giving up commutativity helps to maintain the validity of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle in algebraic quantum field theory.

Related paper:

16 May  (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
János Tanács
Department of Philosophy and the History of Science
Budapest University of Technology and Economics

A Bolyaiak absurdum-vezérelt helyettesítési kísérletei a Párhuzamosok Problémájának megoldására
(The absurdum-guided methodology of the two Bolyais in the attacking of the Euclidean Parallel Postulate)
Az előadás keretében azt próbálom megmutatni, hogy a Bolyaiak reductio ad absurdum eljárásként számon tartott módszere nem logikai ellentmondás keresésére irányult, következésképpen nem cáfolási funkciót töltött be. Mindez a Párhuzamosok Problémájával összefüggésben a két Bolyai megoldásai kísérleteinek újragondolását kívánja meg.

23 May  (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Peter Rowlands
Science Communication Unit, University of Liverpool
How Schrödinger’s cat escaped the box
Quantum mechanics has often been presented as a strange and undesirable way of doing physics, one that we have to use for calculation, but that makes no physical sense. Many people have supported Einstein in his view that physics ought to be about real particles communicating with each other at a finite speed. However, the deeper we penetrate the more it seems that quantum mechanics presents us not with a problem, but rather an opportunity, because it gives us a key to understanding nature at a deeper philosophical level. The aim of this presentation is to suggest an idea of how we might approach this way of thinking and of what kind of results we might expect.

30 May  (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Karim Bschir
Institute of Philosophy, Leibniz University, Hannover
on leave from
Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences, ETH Zurich

The Implications of Szabó's Physicalist Account of Mathematical Truth for Scientific Realism
László Szabó's physicalist account of mathematical truth leads to the remarkable epistemological consequence that there is no higher degree of certainty in mathematics than the one generated through empirical inductive generalizations. Accordingly, all knowledge, mathematical knowledge included, must be seen as empirical knowledge. We will elaborate the implications of this account for the debate on scientific realism. The upshot of our analysis will be that even ontological knowledge, i.e. knowledge about what there is, is bounded by the limits of induction, and that an old lesson still holds true: Strict empiricists have to bite the bullet of ontological relativity.