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The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!

The 60 minute lecture is followed by a 10 minute break and a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.

The scope of the Forum includes all aspects of theoretical philosophy, including:
  • logic and philosophy of formal sciences
  • philosophy of science
  • modern metaphysics
  • epistemology
  • philosophy of language
  • problems in history of philosophy and history of science, relevant to the above topics
  • particular issues in natural and social sciences, important for the discourses in the main scope of the Forum.


19 March (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Elena Sklifova
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös University, Budapest

Topic: non-propositional knowledge

26 May (Wednesday) 5:00 PM  Room 226
Cory Wright
Department of Philosophy, California State University - Long Beach
Functionalism about truth and the modified Ramsey-Lewis sentence
Dialectically, functionalists about truth create space for their view by rejecting that of a close cousin: pluralism about truth. The rejection is based, inter alia, on arguments for the claim that pluralism is incoherent or otherwise unstable.  Functionalists then employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term /true/ in order to show that their view is appropriately monistic and unequivocal, but can nevertheless accommodate the pluralists' intuitions. In this talk, I show why the instability arguments fail, and then show that employment of Ramsification itself instigates a kind of epistemic circularity; for using it requires determining that the theory which introduces that term is itself true.  Without a dissolution, this problem is sufficient to render functionalism about truth inadequate.  Lastly, I consider a variety of putative dissolutions to the problem of epistemic circularity---each of which is shown to be unsatisfactory---and then offer a solution on functionalists’ behalf.  The upshot, however, is that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.