Printable poster:

The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!

The 60 minute lecture is followed by a 10 minute break and a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.

The scope of the Forum includes all aspects of theoretical philosophy, including:
  • logic and philosophy of formal sciences
  • philosophy of science
  • modern metaphysics
  • epistemology
  • philosophy of language
  • problems in history of philosophy and history of science, relevant to the above topics
  • particular issues in natural and social sciences, important for the discourses in the main scope of the Forum.


3 December

There will be no seminar session!

Nyelvfilozófiai miniszümpozium - MTA Filozófiai Kutatóintézet (14:00)

10 December 4:00 PM  Room 226
Rosen Lutskanov
Institute for Philosophical Research, Sofia
The meaning of logical constants in proof-theoretic semantics
According to the classical Tarskian semantics the logical constants are precisely those elements of the language L that receive fixed meaning in all domains of interpretation. On that account their topically neutral meaning is fixed by the analytically true propositions included in the recursive definition of the predicate “true in L”. This approach has two serious disadvantages: (1) the above mentioned definition of the notion “logical constant” involves implicit quantification over the class of all sets; (2) the clear demarcation between the properly logical and the signifying elements of the language is hard to be retained in view of Quine’s influential attack against the analytic / synthetic distinction. In my presentation I’ll try to show that if we switch to the theoretical framework of proof-theoretic semantics the meaning of the notion of logical constant becomes much clearer: to the properly logical part of the language belong those elements of the underlying language that obey some easy specifiable structural requirements. The merit of this approach is that if we turn to some type of dynamic logic we may view the meaning of logical constants as something which is not given from the outset but develops in the process of the revision of the extension of the predicate “provable proposition”. Such reconstruction provides strong support for the claim of the quasi-empirical character of logical knowledge.

17 December 4:00 PM  Room 226
Attila Tanyi
Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm
Reason and Desire: the Role of Pleasure
The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by human desires. The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first thesis), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second thesis), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first thesis. It invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. desires for the pleasure that attaining the object of the desire brings. The aim of the paper is to defend the thesis by bringing the alleged counterexample under its scope. I first point out that reference to hedonic desires as a counterexample presupposes a particular understanding of pleasure, which we might call desire-based. In response I draw up two alternative accounts, the phenomenological and the tracking views. Although several objections can be raised to both accounts, I argue in detail that they are not as implausible as their opponents claim them to be.

Related paper:
Reason and Desire: The Role of Pleasure and Pain