Ruzsa on Quine’s Argument against Modal Logic

Zsófia Zvolenszky
zvolenszky@phil.elte.hu

Department of Logic, Eötvös University of Budapest

Through the 1970s and 1980s—the days when ELTE Philosophy was named Marxism-Leninism—Imre Ruzsa prepared logic books and articles with sharp, comprehensive, up-to-date surveys of the most recent international developments in logic and the philosophy of language. For decades to come, the chapters of his *Classical, Modal and Intensional Logic* would be just about the only Hungarian-language sources available on W. V. O. Quine’s famous argument against modal logic, on Saul Kripke’s modal semantics that seemed to bypass the Quinean objections, and on Kripke’s arguments about the semantics of natural language: that proper names are rigid designators. My talk will explore these chapters of Ruzsa’s book, showing just how much of the Quinean argument Ruzsa got right, and what aspects of it he, along with nearly all his contemporaries, missed. Based primarily on John Burgess’s subsequent work, we can shed new light on connections not so much between Quine’s argument and Kripke’s formal work (as Ruzsa and others had thought), but instead between the Quinean argument and Kripke’s thesis about proper names being rigid designators.