It is well-known that the logical system for the logicist foundation of mathematics exposed in *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* is inconsistent. The contradiction is derived from the infamous Basic Law V. This principle is crucial to Frege's logicism as it embeds the tenet that tightly connects natural numbers, conceived as equivalence classes, to concepts. As far as it is currently known, moreover, the so far provided consistent subsystems of Grundgesetze displaying some version of Basic Law V cannot interpret second-order Peano arithmetic. This seems to show that Frege's programme could not be completely recovered, after all. Secondly, these subsystems may be challenged with respect to the issue of to what extent they actually capture Frege's notion of concept. In particular, both these subsystems are based on a more or less radical limitation of the universe of Fregean concepts, which seems to be incompatible with Frege's spirit.

The aim of this article is to present a consistent predicative second-order system with plural comprehension and Basic Law V, *Plural Grundgesetze (PG)*, which is capable of deriving second-order Peano axioms. The main features of *PG* are plural quantification, which will guarantee the power of full second-order logic to *PG*, and predicative comprehension for concepts. I will also analyse the issue regarding predicativism from a Fregean perspective.