[MaFLa] Meghivo Hans Radder eloadasaira

Ropolyi Laszlo ropolyi at caesar.elte.hu
Fri Mar 30 14:33:35 CEST 2012

Tisztelt kollegak!

AZ ELTE Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszekenek vendegekent ket 
eloadast tart a kozeljovoben Budapesten

Hans Radder
tudomany es technikafilozofus
az amszterdami Vrije Universiteit, Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte tanara

Az eloadasokon minden erdeklodot orommel latunk!


Az elso eloadasra

2012 aprilis 2-án, hetfon delutan 6 orakor

az ELTE TTK Lagymanyosi kampuszanak Deli Tombjeben, a 0.827-es termeben 
(Budapest, 1117 Pazmany setany 1/c, foldszint) kerul sor

"Mertonian values, scientific norms, and the commodification of academic 

cimmel. Az eloadas kivonata:

Since the 1980s the commodification of academic science has strongly 
increased. To be sure, science at large has always included research 
primarily carried out for its economic benefit, especially since the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Yet, the large-scale 
commodification of academic science is a more recent phenomenon. In the 
course of the past decade, this phenomenon has been explored and a variety 
of studies have become available. Assessments of the rise of 
entrepreneurial academia differ sharply. On the one hand, it is welcomed 
and sometimes even seen as a necessary step in the history of academic 
institutions (e.g., Gibbons et al. 1994; Etzkowitz 2004). On the other 
hand, the problematic consequences of commodified academic science are 
also widely discussed and increasingly acknowledged (Shulman 1999; Bok 
2003; Krimsky 2003; Healy 2006; Resnik 2007; Radder 2010).
 	In response to these problems, universities, research institutes 
and science policy organizations have composed a variety of normative 
codes of good scientific conduct (Kourany 2007). Almost invariably, these 
codes are based on, or derived from, the social ethos of science 
formulated by Robert K. Merton in 1942. The aim of this paper is to find 
out to what extent a Mertonian ethos can still be useful in the present 
context of a strongly commodified science. The discussion will be focused 
on the issue of the patenting of the results of academic research.
 	The plan of the paper is as follows. First, I briefly review 
Merton.s account of the ethos of science. The next section deals with some 
STS criticisms of this account and it suggests a reinterpretation in terms 
of general Mertonian values and more specific scientific norms. I then 
discuss the important issue of the patenting of the results of academic 
research and I demonstrate the significance of a .deflationary 
neo-Mertonian approach. to this issue. My conclusion is that the recent 
practices of public universities stand unjustified. The final section 
addresses some questions regarding the scope and implications of this 
neo-Mertonian critique of commodified science.


A masodik eloadasra

2012 aprilis 4-en, szerdan delutan 5 orakor

az ELTE BTK "Theoretical Philosophy Forum" kereteben a BTK Trefort kerti 
kampuszanak i epuleteben, a 226-os teremben (Budapest, 1088 Muzeum krt. 
4/i) kerul sor

"Does the Brain 'Initiate' Freely Willed Processes? A Critique of 
Libet-Type Experiments and Their Interpretation"

cimmel. Az eloadas kivonata:

In the extensive, recent debates on free will, the pioneering experiments 
by Benjamin Libet continue to play a significant role. The claim that 
these experiments demonstrate the illusoriness of freely willed actions is 
both strongly endorsed and hotly disputed. In this paper, we provide an 
analysis and evaluation of Libet.s experiments from a philosophy of 
science perspective, which differs from the usual approaches in philosophy 
of mind or moral philosophy. Our analysis focuses on Libet.s central 
notion of the .initiation. of freely willed processes by the brain. First, 
we use the INUS theory and the manipulability theory of causation to 
investigate whether the experiments show any causal relationship between 
brain activity, on the one hand, and free decisions or (freely willed) 
motor activity, on the other. In addition, we examine three other 
interpretations of the notion of initiation (in terms of a necessary 
condition, a correlation and a regular succession). We argue that none of 
these four interpretations can be supported by the design and results of 
Libet.s experiments. Significantly enough, on the basis of these 
experiments we cannot even conclude that each free decision, or each 
(freely willed) motor action, is always preceded by a readiness potential. 
Furthermore, more recent Libet-type experiments cannot solve these 
problems either. Our general conclusion is that neither Libet.s nor 
Libet-type experiments can justify the claim that the brain initiates 
freely willed processes.

Az eloadasokon valo talalkozas remenyeben udvozlettel:

Ropolyi Laszlo
ELTE Tudtort. Tudfil Tsz.
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