[MaFLa] CFP: Workshop on Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis – a new book by Ferenc Huoranszki

Réz Anna annarez at gmail.com
Thu May 5 17:39:14 CEST 2011


(Apologies for cross-posting)

“Author Meets Critics” Workshop on* Freedom of the Will: A Conditional
Analysis* – a new book by Ferenc Huoranszki



A one-day “author meets critics” workshop on Ferenc Huoranszki’s recently
published book *Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis* will be held.
The workshop is organized by the “What it is to be human?” research group
and is funded by the Hungarian National Innovation Office (NIH) and Central
European University.


 DATE: 16 September 2011

LOCATION: Central European University (Budapest, Hungary)

DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION OF ABSTRACTS: 15 July 2011


We welcome all contributions related to the conditional analysis of free
will, but preference will be given to abstracts discussing the book. For a
summary of the book please see below.

Please send an abstract of approximately 400 words to humanproject at ceu.hu by
15 July 2011. Plan for 30 minutes presentations with 30 minutes of
discussion. Notification of acceptance will be made by 31 July 2011. For
enquiries regarding the workshop, please contact the organizers at:
humanproject at ceu.hu

* * *

*Ferenc Huoranszki: Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis, Routledge
2010.***

*Freedom of the Will* provides a novel interpretation of G. E. Moore’s
famous conditional analysis of free will and discusses several questions
about the meaning of free will and its significance for moral
responsibility. Although Moore’ theory has a strong initial appeal, most
metaphysicians believe that there are conclusive arguments against it.
Huoranszki argues that the importance of conditional analysis must be
reevaluated in light of some recent developments in the theory of
dispositions.

The original analysis can be amended so that the revised conditional account
is not only a good response to determinist worries about the possibility of
free will, but it can also explain the sense in which free will is an
important condition of moral responsibility. This study addresses three
fundamental issues about free will as a metaphysical condition of
responsibility. First, the book explains why agents are responsible for
their actions or omissions only if they have the ability to do otherwise and
shows that the relevant ability is best captured by the revised conditional
analysis. Second, it aims to clarify the relation between agents’ free will
and their rational capacities. It argues that free will as a condition of
responsibility must be understood in terms of agents’ ability to do
otherwise rather than in terms of their capacity to respond to reasons.
Finally, the book explains in which sense responsibility requires
self-determination and argues that it is compatible with agents’ limited
capacity to control their own character, reasons, and motives.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://phil.elte.hu/pipermail/mafla/attachments/20110505/626e1396/attachment.html>
-------------- next part --------------
_______________________________________________
MaFLa - Hungarian philosophers' mailing list
Archives & Help: http://phil.elte.hu/mafla


More information about the MaFLa mailing list