

Gödel's Incompleteness theorems

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- Source (= textbook):
Smullyan, R., *Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems*, Oxford:
Oxford U.P., 1992.

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Smullyan, R., *Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems*, Oxford:
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- Necessary preliminary knowledge: first-order logic.
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- Webpage: <http://phil.elte.hu/mate/incompl/incompl.html>.
Presentations (pdf-s) will be published after the classes.

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This machine has a Gödelian(-Tarskian) property.

General framework

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- 7 $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathcal{S}$: true sentences.

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$$n \in A^* \leftrightarrow d(n) \in A$$

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$d(h)$ is the Gödel number of $H(h)$. Hence, $H(h)$ is true iff it is not provable.

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The sentence E_n is a Gödel sentence for the set A iff

$$E_n \in \mathcal{T} \leftrightarrow n \in A$$

A diagonal lemma

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- ii. follows from i. and G_1 .

Homework:

1. Prove that if our toy machine prints only true sentences, then it cannot print all the true sentences of the given alphabet.
2. Prove **GT** from **D**.