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5
November (Friday) 4:15 PM
Room 224 + ONLINE
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Miklós
Rédei*
and
Zalán Gyenis**
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*Department
of Philosophy,
Logic and
Scientific
Method, LSE,
London
**Department
of Logic,
Jagiellonian
University,
Krakow
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| The
Maxim of Probabilism, with
examples |
After recalling the
notions of strict and
"up-to-probability-zero"
isomorphisms of classical
(Kolmogorovian) probability
measure spaces, we formulate what
we call the "Maxim of
Probabilism". The Maxim of
Probabilism states that a
necessary condition for a concept
to be genuinely probabilistic is
its invariance with respect to
measure-theoretic isomorphisms of
probability measure spaces. The
functioning of the Maxim of
Probabilism is illustrated by
examples; in particular, some
controversial features of
conditioning via conditional
expectations are clarified by
invoking the Maxim of Probabilism.
The talk is based on the (open
access) paper https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-021-03185-6
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12
November (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224 + ONLINE
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Dániel
Kodaj
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Department
of General Philosophy,
Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös Loránd University
Budapest
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| Metaphysical
undecidability
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This paper aims to
adapt an undecidability theorem
from computer science to
metaphysics, examining its
potential formal and substantive
message there. Specifically, my
goal is to see how the
Scott–Curry theorem from lambda
calculus affects metaphysical
realism. Very roughly, the SCT
entails that no computer program
that is capable of
self-interpretation can express
nontrivial properties of its own
terms (such as function
identity). I will argue that
this result is relevant in the
context of metaphysics too, and
what it says there is that
either properties are not
abundant (either fundamentally
or non-fundamentally) or there
are no semantic facts.
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26
November (Friday) 4:15
PM Room 224 +
ONLINE
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Zoltán
Sóstai
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Department of Logic,
Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös University Budapest
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The
Physical Church–Turing
Thesis and the Halting
Problem
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According to the
physical Church–Turing thesis
every physical system can be
simulated by a universal
computing machine operating by
finite means. Some authors,
especially David Deutsch (in his
book The Fabric of Reality)
and Seth Lloyd (in his article The
Turing Test for Free Will)
draw philosophical conclusions
from the Halting Problem while
using the physical Church–Turing
thesis as a basis. In this
seminar I'll investigate if and
how we can correctly state that
the Halting Problem exists while
assuming that the physical
Church–Turing thesis is true.
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