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| Code of course: **BA-ERA-IPH-S-1, MA-ERA-IPH-S-1** |
| Title of course: **Philosophy of Mind** |
| Lecturer: **Gergely Ambrus** |
| **General aim of the course**:The course provides an introduction to some of the main topics in contemporary philososophy of mind, i. e. different views on the mind-body relation, the nature of consciousness and intentionality.**Content of the courseI. The Mind-Body relation****1. Cartesian Dualism**Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy (II and VI). In CPM.**2. Logical Behaviorism**Ryle, G. *The Concept of Mind*. Chap. 1. Descartes Myth. In CPM.Carnap, R. Psychology in Physical Language. In Ayer (ed.) *Logical Positivism*. New York, Free Press, 1959. 165–198.\***3-4. Materialism****3. Reductionist Materialism: Mind-Brain Identity Theory**Smart, J. J. C. Sensations and Brain Processes. *Philosophical Review* 68 (1959). 141–56. or in CPM.Armstrong, D. M. The Causal Theory of Mind. In CPM. Lewis, D. An Argument for the Identity Theory. *Journal of Philosophy*  63 (1966). 17–25**.****4. Eliminative Materialism**Dennett, D. Quining Qualia. In CPM.Churchland, P. M. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. *Journal of Philosophy* 78 (1981). 67–90.**5-6. Functionalism****5. The Functionalist Conception of the Mind**Putnam, H. The Nature of Mental States. In CPM.Block, N. Troubles with Functionalism. In CPM.**6. The Computationalist Theory of Mind***Classical Cognitivism*Haugland, J. The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 1981(2), 215-226.*Criticism of Classical Cognitivism*Searle, J. R. Minds, Brains and Computers. In CPM. **7. Anomalous Monism**Davidson, D. Mental Events. In CPM.**II. Consciousness**8. **The Problem of Consciousness**Nagel, T. What is it Like to be a Bat? In CPM.Block, N. Concepts of Consciousness. In CPM.**9. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: The Knowledge Argument**Jackson, F. What Mary Didn‘t Know. *The Journal of Philosophy* 5 (1986). 291-295.Levine, J. Leaving out What is it Like. In In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) *Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136. Van Gulick, R. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind. Are We All Just Armadillos (Part I.)? In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) *Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays*.Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 137-154.McGinn, C. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? In CPM.**10. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: Modal Arguments**Kripke, S.: *Naming and Neccesity* (exerpts). In CPM.Chalmers, D. Naturalistic Dualism. In *The Conscious Mind*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 123-140.**III. Intentionality****10. The Nature of Intentionality**Brentano, F. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena (excerpts). In CPM.Chisholm, R. M. "Intentional Inexistence" (excerpts). In CPM.\***11-12. Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality** Fodor, J. Meaning and the World Order. In *Psychosemantics*. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1987. 97-127.Millikan, G. R. Biosemantics. In CPM.**13. Interpretationism: The Intentional Stance**Dennett, D.C. The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In CPM.Dennett, D.C. Real Patterns. *The Journal of Philosophy*. 88 (1991) 27-51.\***14. Intentionality and Phenomenology**Horgan, T. – Tienson, J. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In CPM.AbbreviationCPM = Chalmers, D. (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings*. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.**Grading criteria, specific requirements:**(1) Active participation in the course, 2) presentation, 3) course paper.**Required reading:**listed above, except the texts marked by \*.**Suggested further reading:**the texts marked by \* andBlock, N. – Flanagan, O. J. – Güzeldere, G. (eds.) *The Nature of Consciousness*. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1997.Chalmers, D. (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings*. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) *Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136.Stich, S. – Warfield, T. (eds.) *Mental Representation.* Oxford, Backwell, 1994. |